The appropriate exchange rate regime, in the context of integration of currency markets with financial markets and of large international capital flows, continues to be a policy dilemma. The revealed preference for most governments is for some kind of intermediate regime, suggesting a need to study these regimes more carefully. We find that the majority of countries are moving towards somewhat higher exchange and lower interest rate volatility. Features of forex markets could be partly motivating these choices. In a model with noise trading, non-traded goods, and price rigidities we show that bounds on the volatility of the exchange rate can lower noise trading in forex markets; decrease fundamental variance and improve real fundamentals in a developing economy; and give more monetary policy autonomy to smooth interest rates. Central banks prefer secret interventions where they have an information advantage or fear destabilizing speculation. But in our model, short-term pre-announced interventions can control exchange rate volatility, pre-empt deviations in prices and real exchange rates, and allow markets to help central banks achieve their targets. The long-term crawl need not be announced. We conclude with some discussion of the regime's applicability.
Introduction
The appropriate exchange rate regime is a major policy dilemma, yet the revealed preference for most emerging and small open economy (SOE) governments is for some kind of intermediate regime between a pure fixed or floating exchange rate. Therefore the properties of such regimes, in the context of integration of currency markets with financial markets and of large international capital flows, need to be more carefully studied
1 .
An examination of interest and exchange rate volatility suggests that the majority of countries are moving towards somewhat higher exchange and lower interest rate volatility. Since capital mobility has been rising in the past decade, some exchange rate volatility is essential for greater independence of monetary policy. But features of foreign exchange (forex) markets can magnify exchange rate volatility, since forex transactions are many magnitudes higher than those due to trade or capital flow related transactions.
In such a context, a policy of bounds on the volatility of the exchange rate lowers noise trading activity, and removes potential high volatility equilibria. Thus although monetary policy has to establish the bounds, the free lunch of lower volatility gives more monetary autonomy in equilibrium. Jeanne and Rose (2002) combine a simple purchasing power parity based macro model with the De Long et. al (1991) model of noise trading to show that keeping the variance of the nominal exchange rate within bounds can lower entry of noise traders. We modify their model to bring in structural features of developing and import dependent SOEs, in the simplest possible ways. We allow for non-traded goods, imported and wage push pressures on the price level, price rigidities and inflationary expectations. We simplify their model in other ways, doing away with the overlapping generation structure of noise 1 The East Asian crisis has stimulated a large literature on exchange rate regimes in developing countries. Immediately after the crisis the mainstream view was that only the extremes were feasible. An early influential such argument was Eichengreen (1994) . But even he did not rule out managed floating, and Fischer, a weighty proponent of the bipolar view, has qualified his conclusions in Fischer 2001 . Frankel (1999 labels "the hollowing out of the middle" as unsound, and Williamson (2000) advocates the "BBC" regime: a wide band, and a crawling central rate pegged to a multi-currency basket. Svensson (1994) argues that exchange rate bands increase monetary policy autonomy. See also Bird and Rajan (2000) and Corden (2002) for explorations of specific feasible midpoints.
trader entry. The OG assumption makes a period inordinately long and we show that it is not needed in the current context. We find that their key results continue to hold, although risk premium and exchange rate dynamics exhibit larger volatility than in their paper. Additional results are obtained on the optimal policy and its effects. Ensuring some minimum nominal exchange rate volatility encourages hedging, lowers imported price shocks, and persistent deviations of the real exchange rate that add to fundamental variance. It facilitates smoothing the nominal interest rate at the lowest feasible level, which improves real productivity related fundamentals, even in a steady-state model that focuses on the supply-side.
Central banks prefer secret interventions in situations where they have an information advantage or they fear destabilizing speculation. But in our model announced interventions allow markets to help central banks achieve some of its targets. We conclude with some discussion of the regime's applicability in the context of a typical EME forex market.
The structure of the paper is as follows: after a review, in section 2, of stylized cross country facts on exchange rate regimes and exchange and interest rate volatility, that motivates our analysis, we turn to modeling. Section 3 models the macroeconomic fundamentals bringing in aspects of a developing economy. Section 4 does the same for the microstructure of the forex market. Section 5 puts the two together to obtain the market equilibrium and demonstrate multiple equilibria due to noise trader entry. Section 6 works out the implications for monetary policy. Section 7 evaluates the results in the context of a typical EME forex market. Section 8 concludes. Derivations are in Appendix A, and tables in Appendix B. The latter caveat must be kept in mind in reading Table 2 , which shows the official IMF classification of a set of 24 countries and how it has changed over the period 1995-2002. This period is selected because it has been one of active regime change, and includes points before and after the Asian crisis. The countries are divided into the East Asian countries, a set of mature and SOEs with independent floats, and a set of other emerging market economies with mixed exchange rate regimes. The crisis directly affected Asian countries therefore the regime history of these countries is shown in detail. The second set serve as a control group to compare characteristics, and the third set also reflect the fallout of changing views on optimal exchange rate regimes for emerging and SOEs.
Empirical Stylized Facts
Moreover, we will present other data with respect to this same group of countries. Table 3 gives an estimate of exchange rate volatility for these groups. It is calculated, following Baig (2001) , as the standard deviation of monthly movements (percentage changes) of domestic nominal exchange rates against the U.S. dollar. Table 4 gives a similar volatility picture for short-term interest rates 3 . As expected both interest and exchange rate volatility was high in East Asian countries during the crisis years. These countries moved from very low exchange rate volatility to very high. Post crisis exchange rate volatility fell although it remained higher than in the pre-crisis years. Under a fixed exchange rate the latter's volatility is expected to be low while since the interest rate is used to defend the exchange rate, interest rate volatility would be high. In a crisis the volatility of both would be high. In pure floats exchange rate volatility would be higher while monetary policy is free to target the domestic cycle, including smoothing interest rates. In crises periods such as afflicted the European Monetary System in the early nineties, again the volatility of both would be high. A desirable characteristic of intermediate regimes would be low volatility of both, with that of interest rates lower than that of exchange rates. The former would have some freedom to respond to domestic cycles, but its smoothing would minimize banking crises, facilitate the smooth working of the financial system, and lower the burden of government debt. Bounded volatility in exchange rates, with a market determined central rate, would make for relatively stable exchange rates, yet prevent complacency with regard to exchange rate risk and encourage hedging or otherwise managing risk in forex markets. The intermediate regime we will explore in the model developed below has precisely these features. In this context a careful examination of tables 3 and 4 suggests that most countries are moving towards regimes with these characteristics. Interest volatility has been falling for most countries (excluding Turkey) and is lower than exchange rate volatility although the latter is also bounded.
III Macroeconomic Fundamentals
A basic monetary model of the exchange rate is modified to allow for imperfectly flexible prices and relative purchasing power parity.
A simplified money market equilibrium for the domestic and foreign country (indicated by a superscript *) respectively links log-linearized real money balances inversely to the nominal interest rate. Thus m is the natural log of the money stock, p of the consumer price level and i the nominal interest rate, and the income variable is dropped.
The foreign country is assumed to be in a steady state so that m*, p* and i* are constant and do not have a time subscript. 
Equations (4) and (5) 
Substituting equations (1) and (7) in (8) gives the relationship between real interest and exchange rates:
We make assumptions about stochastic normal processes. These allow useful simplifications. For example, they allow equilibrium decision rules to take simple stable forms, despite the existence of heterogeneous agents, in a stochastic environment:
Assumption 1: Domestic money supply is identically and independently distributed around m in a pure floating exchange rate regime, and defines an average price level p. Using equations (1) and (2) to substitute out the price variables from equation (3), e t can be written as:
In equilibrium equations (8) and (8)' imply that the average risk premium equals the average difference between domestic and foreign interest rates:
Taking expectations of equation (9) using assumptions (1) and (2), and equation (10) leads to:
Where z is the average value of the bracketed term in equation (6), that is, it is the real exchange rate. A depreciation of the domestic currency, or rise in e , occurs with a rise in m . But a higher average interest differential decreases the demand for money balances and therefore also depreciates the domestic currency.
Taking expectations of the PPP equation (3) yields another relationship for e :
We now turn to the forex market, which determines the risk premium, and strongly affects the exchange rate.
IV The Foreign Exchange Market
A major characteristic of the forex market is that turnover is much higher than actual balance of payments (BOP) transactions warrant (see Table 6 , Appendix B). The special features of the exchange rate market are learning from order flow and sharing risks.
These explain the large turnover and excess volatility independent of specific details of market microstructure. Forex dealers vary in their level of information. The order flow itself is an important source of information. Dealers keep trading in order to learn about fundamentals. The other reason for the large turnover is the unwinding of initial positions in order to share risk and achieve optimal currency portfolios. Macroeconomic fundamentals as well as market microstructure is required to understand exchange rate behaviour (Lyons, 2000 , Frankel, 1996 .
Information available to large banks, the main dealers in EMEs, would be very different from that with the others. Even without full capital account convertibility there is enough forex mobility to satisfy equation ( use an overlapping generations structure since their primary purpose is to demonstrate that noise traders can make more profits than informed traders. Therefore they must ensure that the horizon of informed traders is not longer than that of noise traders, so that the former cannot out-wait the latter in the market. But with continual entry of poorly informed agents in the forex market, and their ability to "infect" each other, the OG assumption is not required.
We assume that N traders consider entering the market in each period. Their decisions are made based on information available in period t, and returns are earned in period t+1. A period is defined to be long enough to complete their transactions. Traders have identical endowments and tastes, but differ in their degree of information and in their entry costs. 
Assumption 4:
The entry cost cannot be too small:
If trader j decides to enter, the dummy variable 1 = j t δ , otherwise it is zero. A trader will enter only if her expected utility from entering exceeds that from abstaining.
Assumption 5: All informed traders and a constant number n of noise traders enter domestic security markets. 
where a is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
Her wealth grows at the safe international interest rate plus the excess return on domestic securities minus the cost of entering, if she enters the market.
The excess return ρ t+1 is determined in equilibrium in the domestic security market.
Given assumption 1-3, this is normally distributed in equilibrium. Therefore maximizing equation (14) is equivalent to maximizing the mean-variance objective function:
This function is intensively used in finance, since the demand functions obtained are independent of wealth, so that it is not necessary to keep track of changes in wealth. The maximization gives trader j's demand for domestic securities as:
Traders differ in their expectations regarding excess returns:
Assumption 6: For informed traders, j ≤ N i , expectations are rational. That is, the expected value and conditional variance of excess returns evaluated at time t are equal to their actual mathematical counterparts.
( ) ( )
var var
For noise traders j > N i ,
Thus noise traders perception of the first moments is affected by noise unrelated to fundamentals. Their expectation of excess returns equals the unconditional mean of the excess return ( ) ρ , and a noise term ν t , whose variance is proportional to the actual unconditional variance of the exchange rate, where λ > 0.
V Market Equilibrium
In a rational expectations equilibrium, traders' expectations of excess returns must be consistent with excess returns determined in the macromodel. Second, securities markets must clear, given traders' demand. Third, stochastic processes for e t and ρ t must be consistent with traders expectations. Therefore: 
only if benefit from entry exceeds cost of entry.
( It is possible to solve for ρ by taking the expectation of (24) at t -1.
ii) j t f solves the optimal portfolio allocation problem (14). (iii) The market for domestic currency securities is in equilibrium.
Average excess return on domestic currency securities, ρ increases with var (e), F and a, but falls with entry of noise traders n.
The next step is to obtain the equilibrium exchange rate as a function of fundamentals and noise. To do this an expression for E t ρ t+1 derived from (24) and (25) is used to substitute out E t ρ t+1 from another expression for it obtained by taking expectations of the arbitrage equation (8). This results in an expression for i i t − which is used to substitute out i i t − from the relative purchasing power equation (9), hence:
The derivation of (26) is in Appendix A. Equation (26) confirms that e t and therefore ρ t are i.i.d. around their average values, as required in the definition of equilibrium, and just assumed earlier in assumption 3.
Using (22) to substitute for the variance of noise, ν t , and taking the variance of (26) gives: 
The variance of the exchange rate increased with that of fundamental components m, ε, and z. It also increases with the number of noise traders n.
An equilibrium requires that a constant number of noise traders, n, enter. We now show that this will hold in equilibrium. Individual trader demand (17) implies that noise trader demand rises with ρ and falls with var(e). Therefore trader's benefit from entry will also rise with ρ and fall with var(e). Entry will occur only as long as this benefit exceeds their cost of entry. We can define a smooth twice differentiable benefit function:
where a superscript dash indicates a partial derivative. Trader j will enter the market as long as:
But both ρ and var(e) are functions of n. Equilibrium ρ , equates demand to supply in the domestic currency security market. It is given by equation (25), which can be rewritten as:
A superscript * denotes an equilibrium value. Similarly the equation for equilibrium var(e) (27), derived simultaneously from relative purchasing power parity (9), arbitrage (8), and market equilibrium (24) and (25), can be re-written as:
In equilibrium either all noise traders will enter, or none will enter, or some will enter, so 
At * < ρ ρ or var(e) > var(e)*, benefits to entry are lower than at equilibrium so n will shrink. Both ρ and var(e) depend on n. Therefore a function G can be defined, that determines entry:
Hence equilibrium entry is:
If B( ) > c j then n < n*, noise trader entry will occur and n will rise. Since * ρ falls with n but rises with var(e), and var(e) rises with n, multiple equilibria are possible.
, therefore G can be falling with n at low n as ρ falls. But at high n, the positive effect of n on var(e) and therefore on ρ will dominate, ρ will rise. Hence G will also rise with n at high n. Therefore equilibria are possible both at low and at high n.
Either a few noise traders, or a large number of noise traders will enter the forex market.
But, in each equilibrium, n takes a fixed value as definition 1 requires. The function G determines this value.
Noise traders create risk so var(e) rises and ρ falls with their entry (n). But they also share the risk they themselves create so that ρ rises with var(e). 
That is, the government's objective is to smooth the nominal interest rate and stabilize the domestic price level. A high ω (ω ∈ (0,1)) implies a higher relative weight on price stability compared to interest rate stability. The constraint (35) 
The shock is the sum of fundamental and wages related shock to PPP and an endogenous noise component. Higher levels of the shocks would imply a higher deviation of the price level and interest rate from their respective equilibrium values.
The governments' objective (O) is to minimize the loss function (34) subject to the constraints (35) and (37).
where v is a pre-announced bound set to the variance of the nominal exchange rate.
Minimization of (34) subject to (35) is done in Appendix A. The result is that the government distributes the volatility of the shock X t over p t and i t as follows:
The weights are opposite to those entering the loss function. If ω < 1 -ω equilibrium price volatility will exceed interest volatility. If the loss from price volatility if lower, more of shocks will be passed into price fluctuations. As long as var(e) < v the government does not have to enter the forex market. Only if a large number of noise traders enter will it have to intervene to stabilize the exchange rate, pushing some of the volatility on to p t or i t . But in equilibrium as n falls, so will X t and the volatility to be distributed. The parameter v defines the width of the exchange rate band. This definition in terms of variance keeps the government's problem linear-quadratic and therefore easier to solve. It approximates the working of a passive crawl. The edges of the band are soft because the central ratee is variable and market determined.
Taking account of price rigidities and non-traded goods adds more sources of variation, but also gives the government added degrees of freedom in lowering the variance of the exchange rate.
If some prices are rigid in the short-term, they will be expected to change in the future. A reduced form expression for p t and r t , consistent with rational price expectations is obtained by substituting the FOCs from the government's minimization (38) and (39) in Fisher's equation (7), and solving for rational price expectations (Appendix A). This procedure gives:
Equation (40) implies that a low r t is associated with a low p t . If r exceeds (falls short of) i , the expected nominal rate, p t will be above (below) its average level. The gap between i and r is expected price rise; if
. If i falls when there are price rigidities, some prices are expected to adjust in the future. Since future prices are expected to rise, r must fall to satisfy (1) and (7). Assumption 1 no longer determines money supply since the government's objective (O) is now different from a floating exchange rate regime. It turns out that money supply should smooth interest rates.
Proposition 1: Using m to keep i to the left-hand side of i will achieve the government's objective O, and improve fundamentals.
Proof: 1. A rise in i reduces money demand and a rise in p reduces real money balances.
Therefore, with exogenousm and cost determined flexible prices, i will adjust and both i and p will move together from equation (1). It follows from (35), that both i and p may move in the same direction to absorb a given volatility shock X. Therefore adjusting m to targeting i will not shift p in the opposite direction. O will be achieved.
2. If some prices are rigid in the short-term, a rise in m abovem will raise real balances, hence i must fall for money demand to adjust to supply. But these prices are expected to rise in the future, so r must fall belowi from equation (7), to satisfy money market equilibrium (1). Equation (40) will be satisfied with the price level below its average, and r belowi. There is no pressure on e to rise from equation (9), since the slight fall in i compensates for the slight rise in m. Two cases are possible with respect to wages.
First, if nominal wages are backward looking they will not rise immediately but since some prices rise, there will be a marginal fall in real wages, tending to raise z from equation (6). Second, if nominal wages are forward looking and respond to expected price, immediately in this case or with a one period lag under the first case, real wages rise, and z will tend to fall. But the fall in r will stimulate investments that raise labour productivity and lower a L , thus raising z and back towards its equilibrium value. The fundamental variance z z − , var(e), and n will all be low, and the shock X will be stable.
The government's objective O of reducing deviations of e, i and p from their equilibrium values will be met. The improvements in productivity will tend to lowerp from equation (5), but the rise in nominal wages will tend to raise it, keeping it constant. A consistent equilibrium will result in which average nominal interest rates tend to fall. A fall ini lowersρ from equation (10). This is the development process during which country risk contracts. The alternative policy of raising i would set in the opposite deflationary price expectations, raise r and lower productivity growth. Since nominal wages are often more rigid in the downward direction, real wages will rise, magnifying the adverse effects effects of a fall in investment, and appreciating z, thus raising fundamental variance, var(e), X, and harming the government's objective O.
The empirical stylized facts of section 1, showed that fixed exchange rates are associated with the highest interest rate volatility. A restriction such as var(e) ≤ v, could imply fixed exchange rates if the band is narrow. A large value of v would approximate to a float. But EMEs face the problem of periods of sustained capital inflows where markets, left to themselves, would tend to appreciate the exchange rate; crisis periods of sustained outflows also occur. In inflow periods central banks buy foreign exchange tending to keep the exchange rate rigid 6 , lowering perceived exchange rate risk. Therefore policy to ensure minimum two-way variability in e t and encourage hedging is required. Such intervention can also serve another purpose.
In developing countries world oil (entering our T in equation 4) and food prices have a major impact on domestic prices and wages, and oil imports are important for many SOEs. Tariff barriers are available, but are limited due to international agreements. A preannounced movement in E in the opposite direction to P* (equation 6) while remaining within the variance bounds, would reduce some of the pressure on domestic prices, wages and z, and therefore lower var(e). This alternative way of smoothing ( ) p p t − , would give the central bank more degrees of freedom in adjusting interest rates. Both the central bank and traders would gain monetarily since they would be 'leaning with the wind' selling when the domestic currency is depreciating, unlike in conventional intervention which is 'against the wind', so the central bank buys when the currency is depreciating.
Traders would not be tempted to breach the bounds, and the bounds would be credible, since fundamentals would be improving.
Proposition 2: If announced interventions link bounded two way variability of e t inversely to key world prices of commodities dominant in the trade basket, then the central bank can (i) abort deviations in z from its equilibrium value, thus lowering the fundamental variance affecting var (e) and, (ii) lower ( )
from the supply side.
Proof: A rise in T* will raise P from equations (4) and (5). If wages are sensitive to T this will be reinforced by a rise in W. If the response changes real wages, then z will change from equation (6). The deviation of z from its average will raise var (e) from equation (27) . An inverse adjustment of e to T* will abort this process 7 if it is exactly equivalent, otherwise it will at least moderate it.
Because markets are less deep in emerging market economies and in some SOEs, central bank announcements have large effects. Dominguez and Frankel (1993) argue that forex intervention is successful even in deep markets, where intervention is a tiny fraction of total transactions. It can change the exchange rate even without changing the money supply, if it makes forex traders revise their forecasts of future exchange rates. Official announcements have greater effect than information that is gleaned from central banker's quiet intervention in the market.
These issues need to be explored more fully. At present, we just note that given the trade off (35) in our current model, the government has no incentive to trick agents or display dynamic inconsistency. But the future affects the present because of traders' expectations.
Announced short-term interventions that focus these expectations would, therefore, be optimal. It is difficult to know the equilibrium value of e , but central banks can take the help of the market. As Lyons (2001) suggests: "Fundamentals (broadly defined) are consistent with the market when there is no longer a significant imbalance between buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders -that is, private order flow is not significantly different from zero. Pg. 230." Inflation differentials with trading partners would also be built into the concept of e .
If trend changes in
7 As Rogoff (1996) points out that deviations in z are large and persistent, with a half-life of 4.6 years. Therefore moderating this process would be very useful. 8 Corden (2002) gives this as the major argument against any type of fixed exchange rate, target, or band. The loss of face in being forced off a fixed peg is "too sensational".
VII Emerging Market Economy Forex Markets
In this section we make a preliminary exploration to see if the policy recommendations following from the model are at all applicable given the current state of emerging market economy forex markets. Table 5 gives a comparative picture of such country currencies in global forex markets. There has been rapid change in this period; many currencies that were almost absent in global trade are acquiring some position. But it also brings out the huge difference between emerging and developed country markets. Table 6 There are normally fewer impediments to trading in the forward segment of the exchange market relative to those affecting cash transactions in the money markets. The tentative conclusion suggested is that typical features of forex markets such as noise trading would be found in emerging markets also; but the markets are shallower and central banks can more easily dominate them. Since markets are thin, they require intervention. For example, in periods of stability in the Indian exchange rate, there is considerable decline in demand in the forward market, and forward premia fall. Table 7 gives a picture of the institutional structure of the Indian forex market. It shows a lack of depth and a process of deepening; the dominance of financial institutions but the Canceling of forwards occurs to unwind hedges. Otherwise these trades would have gone to offshore markets. Since hedges are now available transacting parties should be able to tolerate bounded fluctuations.
RBI intervention is secret. It asks certain banks (SBI, Bank of India etc) to trade in forex markets when it wants to intervene. Although nothing is announced, the market finds that the banks are coming to the market to deal in forex and thereby the market and the media "guess" that the RBI is intervening. Total past interventions have been, however, reported since 1995, in the monthly bulletin (RBI), in a move towards greater transparency. In the current state of the market, the RBI and the ADs, could handle announced interventions without encouraging large-scale noise trader entry. The bounded volatility would, however, encourage more transactions and hedging, raise profits, and deepen markets 10 .
VIII Conclusion
The exchange rate regime we examine in this paper satisfies the three desirable features such a regime should possess (Corden, 2002) . It delivers the relatively stable exchange rates required to encourage trade, but allows policy to achieve the real targets required to improve macroeconomic fundamentals. Second, it contributes to the prevention of inflation thereby partially fulfilling a role as nominal anchor. Third, improvement in real fundamentals and the passive central crawl that maintains the exchange rate near equilibrium lowers the probability of crises. As unhedged foreign currency borrowing is discouraged the financial factors that compound currency crises are prevented from setting in. Since the regime contributes a little to each of these objectives, delivers both stability and flexibility, lies between the two corner regimes, and moreover allows the Central Bank to work with markets, it is truly a case of middling through. The bounded exchange rate is compatible with free capital inflows and some monetary policy Appendix A 1.
To derive equilibrium exchange rates, that is, equation (26):
Step 1: Substituting out F from (24) and (25) and solving for E t (ρ t+1 )
Step 2: Rewrite the uncovered interest parity or arbitrage equation (8) Step 3: Substituting out E t (ρ t+1 ) obtained in steps 1 and 2 implies
Step 4: Subtracting its expected value (11) from the relative PPP equation (9) Source: BIS Note: 1. Because two currencies are involved in each transaction, the sum of the percentage shares of individual currencies total 200% instead of 100%. The figures relate to reported "net-net" turnover, i.e. they are adjusted for both local and cross-border double counting. 2. For 1992-98, the data cover local home currency trading only. Total forex derivatives as % of total spot -------0.06
Note:
(1) to (7) have been calculated from RBI bulletins. The data was collected for all the months in the given years and summed up. Each year is taken from July to June (8) to (14) are figures for the month of April as is available in the Central Bank Surveys (BIS) (9) to (14) are as percentage to (8); (14) which comprises currency swaps and OTC options was negligible for the year 1998-99 1* All transactions involve exposure to more than one currency 2* Excluding "tomorrow/next day" transactions 3* A swap is considered to be a single transaction in that the two legs are not counted separately. Including "tomorrow/next day" transactions FCY:
Foreign currency INR:
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Reporting dealers
